The UK will be looking for a ‘transition period’ after formal Brexit, for up to two years. During this period, it will continue to have access to EU markets on ‘current terms’, pay into the EU budget, and accept EU rules. After that period, the UK would be looking to agree to a bespoke, deep and comprehensive trade agreement with the EU. The UK and EU should also continue to cooperate closely on security issues. This vision was set out by Teresa May in a speech in Florence on the 22nd September.
The speech was full of warm words about the deep bonds between the UK and Europe, and, by adopting a softertone, Mrs May was looking to reinvigorate the Brexit negotiations which have become bogged-down. However, the position set out was still light on specifics. Although the speech mentioned trading on ‘current terms’ it is not clear exactly what is meant by this. The Government’s ‘position papers’ have clearly stated that the UK will leave the Single Market and Customs Union after 29th March 2019, and then just have (unspecified) ‘access’ to the Single Market. Whether the position has now shifted to retaining Single Market membership and/or retaining the Customs Union is not clear. Leaving the Customs Union would leave many questions unresolved, not least around the Irish border.
During the transition period Mrs May stated that the UK would comply with the ‘existing structure of EU rules and regulations’. This implies the free movement of people would continue, as would the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for the two years – both strongly apposed by hard-line Brexiteers. Mrs May suggested any EU nationals moving to the UK within the transition period would need to register. The continuation of free movement (albeit ‘monitored’) might alleviate some of the concerns the food and farming sector have around access to labour. However, it only ‘kicks the can down the road’ for two more years.
As another concession, the UK would pay its share of the EU budget through to the end of the current accounting period in late 2020. Although Mrs May put no figures on this, it is calculated that this commitment is worth around €20bn. The EU believes that this is not the full extent of the UK’s ‘Brexit Bill’ with figures €50bn or higher being mentioned. Any further payments by the UK will, again, come up against strong opposition from within the Conservative Party.
In the longer term, following the transition, Mrs May ruled out an off-the-shelf trade agreement. She rejected membership of the European Economic Area (aka ‘the Norway option’) as not being a real Brexit. Likewise, doing a deal similar to the one the EU recently concluded with Canada was not seen as ambitious enough, given the depth of the current trading relationship. A future role for the ECJ in settling disputes seemed to be conceded although this would not give it ‘jurisdiction’ over the UK. The future role of the ECJ can seem rather arcane, but it is a real sticking point in the negotiations. For example, it was hoped that it would be quite easy to come to a deal on EU and UK citizens’ rights. But it has foundered on the question of what body enforces those rights – i.e. could the ECJ have power over the UK Government to protect the rights of EU citizens living in the UK?
Whether any of this will be enough to get the talks moving, and allow the EU Summit in October to agree to begin the ‘future relationship’ strand of the negotiations remains to be seen. The response of the EU to the speech was polite, but guarded. It still wishes to see more concrete proposals in many areas. As has been pointed out, making speeches calling for ‘imaginative solutions’ to problems does not actually create imaginative solutions.